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T
he LIBOR-OIS spread has been a closely watched
barometer of distress in money markets for more than
a year. The 3-month London Interbank Offered Rate
(LIBOR) is the interest rate at which banks borrow unsecured
funds from other banks in the London wholesale money mar-
ket for a period of 3 months. Alternatively, if a bank enters
into an overnight indexed swap (OIS), it is entitled to receive
a fixed rate of interest on a notional amount called the OIS
rate. In exchange, the bank agrees to pay a (compound)
interest payment on the notional amount to be determined
by a reference floating rate (in the United States, this is the
effective federal funds rate) to the counterparty at maturity.
For example, suppose the 3-month OIS rate is 2 percent. If
the geometric average of the annualized effective federal
funds rate for the 3-month period is 1.91 percent, there will
be a net cash inflow of $2,250 on a principal amount of $10
million [(2 percent – 1.91 percent) × 3/12 × $10 million =
$2,250] to the bank from its counterparty.
A bank borrowing at the 3-month LIBOR rate of 2.10
percent that enters into a swap to receive at the 3-month OIS
rate of 2 percent has a borrowing cost equal to the effective
federal funds rate plus 10 basis points. Entering into the OIS
exposes the bank to future fluctuations in the reference rate.
However, the bank can guarantee itself longer-term funding
while still paying close to the overnight rate.
Because the alternative would be rolling
over the funds on a daily basis at chang-
ing overnight rates, banks are willing to
pay a premium. This is reflected in the
LIBOR-OIS spread (defined as the dif-
ference between the LIBOR rate and the
OIS rate) shown in the chart. In times
of stress, the LIBOR, referencing a cash
instrument, reflects both credit and liquid-
ity risk,1 but the OIS has little exposure
to default risk because these contracts do
not involve any initial cash flows. The
OIS rate is therefore an accurate measure
of investor expectations of the effective
federal funds rate (and hence the Fed’s
target) over the term of the swap, whereas
LIBOR reflects credit risk and the expec-
tation on future over  night rates.
Before the onset of the turmoil in the credit markets in
August 2007, the LIBOR-OIS spread was around 10 basis
points. However, in just over a month, the spread rose to 85 basis
points on September 14, 2007, when the Bank of England
announced emergency funding to rescue the troubled Northern
Rock, one of the U.K.’s largest mortgage lenders. The spread
reached its all-time high at 108 basis points on December 6,
2007. Around the same time, large investment banks such as
UBS and Lehman Brothers announced huge write-downs. On
March 17, 2008, the collapse of Bear Stearns led to an 83-basis-
point spread, a 19-basis-point increase from the previous trad-
ing day. In the latest illiquidity wave following the failure of
Lehman Brothers, the spread was 365 basis points (as of
October 10, 2008). In short, the LIBOR-OIS spread has been
the summary indicator showing the “illiquidity waves” that
severely impaired money markets in 2007 and 2008.
—Rajdeep Sengupta and Yu man Tam
1 Liquidity risk is the risk that a bank could not convert its assets into cash, whereas
credit risk is the risk that it could fail to meet its contractual obligations. Some
have claimed that this distinction is unclear and that, particularly in the case of
financial institutions, “the definition of liquidity is elusive.” See von Thadden,
Ernst-Ludwig. “Liquidity Creation Through Banks and Markets: Multiple
Insurance and Limited Market Access.” European Economic Review, April 1999,
43(4-6), pp. 991-1006.
The LIBOR-OIS Spread as a Summary Indicator
research.stlouisfed.org
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
Aug
06
Oct
06
Dec
06
Feb
07
Apr
07
Jun
07
Aug
07
Oct
07
Dec
07
Feb
08
Apr
08
Jun
08
Aug
08
Oct
08
3-Month LIBOR-OIS Spread
September 14, 2007
Northern Rock Crisis
December 10, 2007
Bank Writedowns
March 17, 2008
Collapse of 
Bear Stearns
October 10, 2008
Global Banking Crisis